Kousar Khan
The Qur’an gives a simple principle for those entrusted with authority: “Indeed, Allah commands justice.” (16:90)
But justice is not only about courts and laws. It is also about whether a child in a remote district has the same opportunity to study as a child in a provincial capital. Those entrusted with power are ultimately responsible for how they administer the affairs of the people. This principle raises an important question for Pakistan today: can a country of more than 240 million people, spread across vast and diverse territories, continue to be governed effectively through the same four-province structure designed more than half a century ago?
A country can remain geographically unchanged while its administrative needs change completely. Pakistan is a very different country today from the Pakistan of 1947, or even the Pakistan of 1970. Its population has multiplied, its cities have expanded, its economy has become more complex, and the expectations of its citizens have changed. Yet when it comes to its basic provincial structure, Pakistan is still largely operating with a framework designed for a very different era.
The debate over new provinces is therefore not new, nor is it the product of one political party or one political moment. For the last three to four decades, demands for Bahawalpur, Hazara, Saraikistan and other administrative units have repeatedly surfaced. These demands have survived changes of governments, political parties and constitutional arrangements. Following recent constitutional developments, the question has once again returned to the national conversation. Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi has recently argued that Pakistan’s existing system has become incapable of resolving its problems and calls for political consensus on new administrative units.
The question we should therefore ask is not whether Pakistan should be divided. Pakistan must not be divided. The question is whether four provinces are still the most effective way to administer a country of Pakistan’s present size, population and complexity.
History itself tells us that administrative boundaries are not sacred. At independence in 1947, Pakistan inherited a much more diverse administrative arrangement, including East Bengal, West Punjab, Sindh, the North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan, alongside other territories and princely states. The country covered roughly 948,000 square kilometres across its eastern and western wings.
Then came the One Unit scheme in 1955, when the provinces and other administrative arrangements of West Pakistan were merged into a single province called West Pakistan. The purpose was largely political and constitutional: to create parity between East and West Pakistan. But the experiment generated strong opposition in the western regions and was eventually dissolved in 1970. The old provincial structure of Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan was restored.
That four-province structure has essentially remained the backbone of Pakistan’s federation ever since. The important question is: does a structure designed in 1970 adequately serve Pakistan in 2026?
Consider the numbers.
When the four-province structure was restored in 1970, Pakistan’s population was roughly six crore. The 1972 census recorded 65.3 million people, after the separation of East Pakistan. Today, the latest official census has already put Pakistan’s population at 241.49 million, more than 24 crore. Punjab alone has 127.68 million people, while Sindh has 55.69 million, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 40.85 million and Balochistan 14.89 million.
In other words, the population has increased enormously while the basic provincial map has hardly changed.
And this is where the argument for new provinces becomes an argument for better governance rather than identity politics.
Punjab, for example, covers about 205,345 square kilometres and has a population greater than 127 million. Balochistan covers approximately 347,190 square kilometres. These are enormous administrative spaces. Expecting one provincial government to plan, manage and deliver services equally effectively across such vast and diverse territories is an enormous challenge.
A citizen in a remote district should not have to feel that the provincial government exists hundreds of kilometres away. Whether the issue is education, healthcare, policing, agriculture, infrastructure, investment or employment, the government becomes more effective when decision-making is closer to the people affected by those decisions.
The international experience is also worth examining.
Nigeria is perhaps one of the most relevant examples. It became independent in 1960 with three regions. It later created four regions and then progressively reorganised them into 12 states in 1967, 19 in 1976, 21 in 1987, 30 in 1991 and finally 36 states in 1996. This did not make Nigeria cease to be Nigeria. Rather, successive governments repeatedly adjusted its internal administrative structure to address questions of representation, regional balance, minorities and governance.
Turkey, with a population considerably smaller than Pakistan’s, is organised into 81 provinces and 922 districts. Indonesia has 38 provinces, while Brazil has 26 states and a Federal District, together with more than 5,500 municipalities.
India, another enormous and diverse South Asian federation, has 28 states and eight Union Territories. The point is not that Pakistan must blindly copy these countries. It is that large, populous and geographically diverse states routinely evolve their internal administrative structures as their societies grow.
India’s own experience is particularly instructive. In 1966, the former Indian Punjab was reorganised, resulting in the creation of Haryana, changes to Punjab, and the transfer of several hill areas to Himachal Pradesh. The Indian Parliament formally enacted the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966. Administrative reorganisation did not destroy India’s national unity; it created structures that better reflected the administrative and linguistic realities of those areas.
Pakistan has similar unresolved questions. Hazara has witnessed a longstanding demand for a separate province. Southern Punjab has repeatedly seen demands for greater administrative and political representation. Bahawalpur has its own historical provincial claim. Similar discussions exist regarding divisions of Balochistan, Sindh and other regions.
But there is an important distinction that Pakistan must maintain: new provinces should not become a project of ethnic fragmentation.
*The safest and most constructive model is one based primarily on geography, population, administrative convenience, economic viability and public consent, not hatred of another ethnicity or province., Existing administrative divisions can provide a starting point. Whether the country eventually has eight, ten, twelve or a larger number of provinces is a question that should be decided through serious demographic, economic and administrative studies rather than political slogans.
Proposals for around 32 administrative units are already part of the wider debate, but the exact number should not become the objective. Better governance should be the objective.
There is also no reason to see stronger provinces as a threat to a stronger federation. In fact, the opposite can be true. When people believe that their government understands them, represents them and invests in their region, their confidence in the federation can increase. A citizen who receives effective healthcare, education, policing and infrastructure from a government located closer to home has fewer reasons to believe that the state is distant or indifferent.
The lesson of Pakistan’s own history is that administrative structures can change without changing the identity of Pakistan. The merger of FATA into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through the 25th Constitutional Amendment in 2018 was another major example of Pakistan adapting its constitutional and administrative framework to bring previously exceptional territories into the mainstream.
This is why the debate over new provinces should be taken out of the narrow framework of party politics. It should be treated as a national governance question.
Pakistan does not need more divisions. Pakistan needs more effective administration. It needs a government that can reach the last citizen, development that can reach the last district and institutions that can respond before a local problem becomes a national crisis.
Creating new provinces will not, by itself, eliminate corruption, unemployment or weak governance. New boundaries without institutional reform would simply create more bureaucracies. Therefore, provincial reorganisation should go hand in hand with empowered local governments, fiscal responsibility, professional administration, transparent resource distribution and strong accountability.
The debate should ultimately be settled constitutionally, peacefully and through broad political and public consensus. As Mohsin Naqvi himself has argued, the question of new administrative units needs to be taken to the people and settled through political consensus.
Pakistan’s strength has never depended on the number of lines drawn on its map. Its strength comes from the people who live within those lines, and from a state capable of serving them equally.
New provinces, if designed wisely, should not mean a smaller Pakistan. They can mean a Pakistan where the state is closer to its citizens, development is more balanced, representation is wider and governance is more effective.
The purpose, therefore, should not be to redraw Pakistan for the sake of redrawing it. The purpose should be much bigger: to build a stronger, more capable and more united Pakistan by bringing the government closer to the people.
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