The Meticulously Crafted Trap -

by Muhammad Mohsin Iqbal
The situation in the Gulf has grown steadily clearer of late, and with it the realisation that neither Israel nor its principal patron, the United States, can secure their wider aims unless Saudi Arabia is at length brought into line. Direct persuasion having failed to draw Riyadh into recognition of the Abraham Accords, both parties appear to have resorted to more circuitous means of tightening the noose. What once seemed a confused picture of regional tension now reveals a deliberate design intended to isolate the Kingdom and compel a change of course.
Events about the Bab el-Mandeb Strait were never without purpose. Their true object has been to hem Saudi Arabia in and to multiply the pressures bearing upon it from several quarters at once. These pressures, it is increasingly plain, form part of a concerted American and Israeli calculation intended to edge the Kingdom towards the Accords by rendering its present independence of policy progressively more costly. An international news agency has reported that the Houthis have approached the Trump administration with a request that Washington refrain from direct military involvement against them. In the same breath they have given assurance that the maritime passage through Bab el-Mandeb will remain open to American, Israeli, French and other foreign shipping—with one notable exception: vessels connected with Saudi Arabia. This selective exclusion is of particular significance, for it strikes at the heart of Saudi commercial and strategic interests while sparing those of the very powers seeking Riyadh’s compliance.
President Trump, for his part, has confirmed that he has spoken with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and that Riyadh sought American military intervention against the Houthis. Washington declined to commit forces of its own, offering instead only the provision of intelligence support. The refusal to engage directly, while simultaneously withholding substantial military assistance, leaves the Kingdom to face escalating threats largely alone. A closer examination of the wider scene brings the pattern into sharper relief. The Strait of Hormuz remains under strain; Bab el-Mandeb is likewise constrained; Saudi Arabia’s East-West oil pipeline has already been struck by hostile action. Houthi missiles and drones continue to raise the temperature across land and sea routes vital to the Kingdom’s economy, while the United States still withholds both direct military action and even substantial direct military aid. Can so many converging difficulties be dismissed as mere coincidence? It seems unlikely.
The apparent design is rather to raise the cost of Saudi Arabia’s present political stance by degrees until that stance becomes progressively harder to sustain. At a chosen moment Washington might then observe that it holds the means of relieving the pressure—provided only that the puzzle of the Abraham Accords is first resolved. In this manner the Kingdom would be presented with a stark choice: continued isolation and vulnerability, or diplomatic realignment under American and Israeli auspices. Other speculations regarding this matter are also circulating, appearing to be driven by vested interests; however, only time will reveal the game being played behind the scenes.
Yet this Israeli-American strategy faces a considerable impediment in the shape of the Mecca Agreement and in Turkey’s expanding influence at both regional and international levels. The Mecca Agreement, which sought to foster greater unity among Muslim states on questions of collective security and religious solidarity, continues to meet with resistance in various quarters precisely because it offers an alternative framework to the Accords. Turkey’s growing diplomatic and military role further complicates the picture, providing Riyadh with potential counterweights and alternative channels of support that dilute the force of Western leverage. What is now unfolding may therefore be read as an Israeli effort to enlarge its diplomatic reach across the region by opening new channels, employing for the purpose such indirect instruments of pressure as the Houthis and certain Iraqi drone groups. These non-state actors serve usefully as proxies, allowing deniability while steadily increasing the sense of encirclement.
As reported, the recent drone attacks in the vicinity of the Holy Mosques are especially disquieting and demand the closest attention. Any threat, however remote, to the sanctity of Mecca and Medina carries profound religious and political implications for Saudi Arabia’s standing in the Muslim world, and the timing of such incidents cannot be regarded as accidental. At the same time, every oil-producing state finds itself under serious challenge from fluctuating markets, regional insecurity and external pressures, while even non-producing Muslim countries—Pakistan among them—confront circumstances in many respects more testing than those faced by the West. Pakistan, bound by historical ties of faith and diplomacy to Saudi Arabia, must navigate increasing difficulties of its own, ranging from economic strain to the delicate balancing of relations with both Western powers and fellow Muslim states. How it is to do so, without compromising its principles or its security, remains an open and pressing question.
In sum, the pressures now converging upon Saudi Arabia—from the closure of vital sea lanes to selective targeting of its infrastructure and the calculated restraint of its traditional allies—appear designed to force a fundamental revision of its foreign policy. Whether the Mecca Agreement and the emerging role of Turkey will prove sufficient to resist that design remains to be seen, but the outlines of the strategy are no longer in doubt.