Barrister Dr. Usman Ali
Pakistan’s constitutional history shows that changes made for short-term political comfort return as long-term national pain. The proposed 27th Amendment must not repeat that cycle.
Constitutions are not meant to serve the impulses of any government or the ambitions of a few individuals. They are intended to provide continuity, stability, and justice across generations. Yet Pakistan’s history reveals a persistent temptation to bend the Constitution for short-term political gain, often under the pretext of reform or efficiency. Each such amendment, made in haste or for expediency, has left deep marks on the country’s political fabric. The current discussion surrounding the proposed 27th Constitutional Amendment should therefore be approached with extraordinary caution and humility.
The proposed amendment, as indicated by PPP Chairman Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, is said to include the creation of a Constitutional Court, alterations to Article 243 concerning the command of the armed forces, changes in the structure of the judiciary through the introduction of executive magistrates and transfer of judges, and even adjustments to the National Finance Commission Award and the federal domain over education and population planning. These are not routine legal refinements; they touch the very architecture of Pakistan’s federal system, its civil-military balance, and the independence of the judiciary. Any alteration in such foundational provisions must rest on the broadest possible consensus. Otherwise, history warns, even well-intentioned reforms can become future regrets.
The Constitution of 1973 was built on a rare national unity after decades of political discord and the trauma of national disintegration. Its spirit was parliamentary, democratic, and federal ,designed to ensure that no single individual or institution could dominate the state. Yet, soon after its adoption, amendments began reshaping it to fit the needs of the rulers of the day. The Eighth Amendment of 1985 stands as the most glaring example. Enacted under General Zia-ul-Haq’s martial law, it transformed the presidency into a seat of arbitrary power through Article 58(2)(b), which allowed the president to dissolve the National Assembly at will. This amendment destabilized the democratic order for nearly two decades. Between 1988 and 1999, it was invoked repeatedly to send elected governments home, creating an atmosphere of political uncertainty and weakening public faith in parliamentary rule.
When civilian leadership returned, the Thirteenth Amendment sought to reverse that damage by stripping away the president’s power to dismiss governments. Yet the pendulum swung again. In 2003, under General Pervez Musharraf, the Seventeenth Amendment restored presidential supremacy, institutionalized the National Security Council, and tilted the constitutional balance once more. That too did not endure. In 2010, through the Eighteenth Amendment, the political parties reclaimed parliamentary authority, curtailed the president’s powers, and decentralized key subjects to the provinces. While the Eighteenth Amendment was celebrated as a democratic triumph, its broad and hurried devolution has continued to generate friction between the federation and provinces. Sectors like education, health, and population welfare , now again under discussion for re-federalization , have struggled with uneven performance, funding gaps, and accountability disputes.
The pattern is unmistakable: constitutional amendments driven by immediate political objectives or narrow interpretations of national interest do not create lasting solutions. They shift the imbalance from one side to another, leaving the underlying issues unresolved. Every such intervention, whether military or civilian, has been followed by a reversal or a compensatory amendment. This cycle of constitutional overcorrection has drained the state of institutional continuity and public trust. The result is a political culture where every government seeks to rewrite the rules instead of strengthening the existing framework.
A Constitution cannot be an instrument of convenience. It is a covenant , one that demands restraint even when power tempts expansion. The damage from repeated alterations is not merely legal; it is moral and psychological. It tells the people that their most sacred national document can be reshaped whenever it suits the powerful. It tells investors, civil servants, and judges that stability is fleeting. It tells the provinces that the guarantees of autonomy are conditional. No democracy can mature in such a climate of uncertainty.
If there is genuine need for constitutional reform, it must be pursued transparently and inclusively. All political parties, provincial governments, jurists, and civil society stakeholders must be taken into confidence before even the first draft is prepared. The discussion should occur not in secrecy but in Parliament, the media, universities, and public forums. Only through broad deliberation can the nation distinguish between an amendment that strengthens democracy and one that merely rearranges authority. The tragedy of Pakistan’s constitutional history is not that it has evolved, but that it has evolved under pressure rather than principle.
Those who hold power today should remember that the Constitution outlives every government. What seems advantageous now may haunt them tomorrow when the roles are reversed. History is unkind to those who treat foundational law as a political toolkit. Zia’s amendment eventually undid his political legacy. Musharraf’s amendment collapsed with his regime. Even the far-reaching Eighteenth Amendment is now being re-examined by some of its own authors. Every generation that altered the Constitution to suit its needs later wished for a different outcome.
This moment demands wisdom, not haste. The temptation to engineer structural change for short-term stability or administrative control must be resisted. The strength of a nation does not lie in how frequently it rewrites its Constitution, but in how faithfully it upholds it. If Pakistan’s leaders can internalize this lesson, then perhaps the proposed 27th Amendment , whatever form it ultimately takes , could become a symbol of national unity rather than the next entry in the long catalogue of constitutional misadventures.
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